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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union ("EU") is in the final stages of putting
into place a Directive on consumer goods and associated
guarantees1 that will provide a minimum level of warranty
protection for consumers throughout the EU. The Directive
aims to give all consumers the ability to purchase goods anywhere
in the common market, confident that, should the goods prove
faulty or of poor quality the buyer will be able to obtain
satisfaction from the seller. The Directive sets forth two
categories of guarantees: legal guarantees, which create remedies
for consumer goods that do not conform to the contract of sale,
and commercial guarantees, which create remedies for consumer
goods that do not conform to the seller's express promises about
the goods.2 This Article first explores the evolution of consumer
policy in the EU since the establishment of the European
Economic Community and, second, examines the Directive itself.
It then proceeds to examine the provisions of the Directive and
compares them to commercial sales law in the United States.
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1 Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees
[hereinafter April 1998 Directive].
2 See id., arts. 2 & 3 (requiring seller to deliver goods in conformity with
the contract of sale and holding sellers liable for any lack of conformity).
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Finally, it analyzes whether the provisions of the Directive are
sound consumer policy.
2. EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
One of the mandated tasks of the European Economic
Community ("EEC'), since its inception under the Treaty of
Rome, has been to promote the "harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, [and] an accelerated raising of the standard of
living."3 The goal has been to create a single economic market.
Consumer protection was not seen as an integral part of that
process.4 That is not to say, however, that consumers were
entirely forgotten. The drafters of the Treaty of Rome were
apparently satisfied that consumers would generally benefit from
the effects of market integration.'
2.1. First Attempts
It was not until fifteen years after the establishment of the
EEC, that the European Parliament6 officially called for a
"coherent and effective consumer protection policy."' Three
years after that, the Council of Ministers,. ("Council") the EEC's
' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
4 The only direct reference to consumers is in Article 39 referring to the
Community's agricultural policy, citing the goal of ensuring"reasonable prices
in supplies to consumers." Id. at 30.
1 Andreas P. Reindl, Consumer Contracts and Euro ean Law, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 627, 628 (1997) (discussing the relationship between the European
Community, federalism, and possible benefits to consumer protection efforts).
6 The European Parliament is one of the four principal institutions of the
European Union. Although it has limited constitutional powers, the European
Parliament exercises its influence on the legislative and budgetary processes.
While its approval is not necessary for significant legislation, it must still be
consulted. See NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 110-11 (1989) (discussing the powers of the European
Parliament).
' This Parliamentary Statement was quoted in the introduction to the
Council Resolution on a Preliminary Programme of the European Economic
Community for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy, 1975 O.J.
(C 92) 1,2, para. 1 (referencing a 1972 debate in the European Parliament).
' The Council of Ministers is the principal decision-making body. See
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legislative body, passed a resolution outlining its preliminary
program for a consumer protection and information policy9
detailing the objectives and general principles of a consumer
policy. The Council noted that although consumer protection
was an established concern in the EEC,1  the notion of a
consumer policy was relatively recent, having developed "in
response to the abuses and frustrations arising at times from the
increased abundance and complexity of goods and services
afforded the consumer by an ever-widening market."
1
The Council recognized that the role of the consumer had
changed dramatically since the European Community was first
established. As a mere unit in a mass market, the consumer had
become "the target of advertising campaigns and of pressure by
strongly organized production and distribution groups.""2
Consequently, producers and distributors exerted more control
than consumers over market conditions, resulting in a shift of
power from the consumer to these larger economic players.13
The changed conditions made it imperative that the EU take steps
to ensure that consumers are better informed of their rights and
protected from abuses by those in the distribution chain of
consumer goods.
Among the five basic rights" of consumers articulated in the
Council's Resolution are two that specifically set the stage for the
Directive: The right to protection of economic interests and the
right of redress. The right to the protection of economic interests
includes protection against the abuse of power by a seller."s
Specifically, it includes protection from one-sided standard
contracts and the unfair exclusion of essential rights; protection
against damage to consumers' economic interests caused by
9 See Council Resolution on a Preliminary Programme, supra note 7.
10 The resolution includes a compilation of actions of interest to
consumers taken by the Community and Council Directives of interest to
consumers. See Council Resolution on a Preliminary Programme, supra note
7, at 12, 13, apps. 1, 2.
11 Id- at 3, para. 6.
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 The five rights are listed as (a) the right to protection of health and
safet (b) the right to protection of economic interests, (c) the right of redress,
(d) the right to information and education, and (e) the right of representation
(the right to be heard). See id. at 2, para. 3.
15 See id. at 6, para. 19.
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defective products or unsatisfactory services; and reliable after-
sales services for consumer durables including providing spare
parts necessary to effect repairs.16 The right of redress includes
provisions for advice and assistance in making complaints as well
as "swift, effective and inexpensive procedures" for rectifying
injury and damage resulting from the purchase or use of defective
goods or unsatisfactory services."
In 1981, the Council followed up with a second resolution,
the purpose of which was "to enable the Community to continue
and intensify its measures [with respect to consumer protection
and information] and to help establish conditions for improved
consultation between consumers on the one hand and
manufacturers and retailers on the other."18 Reconfirming the
consumer rights and principles created in the previous
Resolution, it emphasized the need to have consumers participate
in economic decision making and implementation,1 9 and
suggested that agreements between and among interest groups
would be an effective means to achieve consumer protection
goals.2' Interestingly, rather than focusing on the disparities
between sellers and consumers, the 1981 Resolution stressed the
downturn in economic conditions prevailing at the time in the
EU:
[I]n the current difficult economic situation, a situation
characterized by a slowdown in incomes growth,
continuing unemployment, and the various economic
consequences of the energy dependence which affects most
Member States, consumers are obliged to pay more
attention to the way in which they use their income,
particularly as regards the quality of goods and services
bought, so as to derive maximum benefit from it.21
16 See id.
Iz d. at 8, para. 32.
s Council Resolution on a Second Programme of the European Economic
Community for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy, 1981 O.J.
(C 133) 1, 2, para. 2.
19 See id. at 2, para. 4.
20 See id. at 3, para. 6.
21 Id. at 2, para. 3.
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2.2. Consumer Protection Gains Momentum
Although consumer protection efforts remained a concern in
the interim, it was not until a number of years after the second
Resolution that significant action began on the consumer
protection front. Two important events signaled the start of a
new era in consumer protection. The first was a 1986 Council
Resolution recognizing the difficulties encountered by consumers
invoking guarantees on products purchased in other Member
States.' The second was the 1987 passage of the Single European
Act ("SEA").' Until its passage, legislative efforts relating to
consumer protection had to be based on Article 100 of the Treaty
of Rome.2 The fact that Article 100 provides a limited legal basis
for consumer protection, and its requirement of a unanimous
vote by the Council of Ministers, has operated to hinder
consumer protection initiatives.' The SEA took a significant step
by authorizing the Community to adopt legislation in
furtherance of the creation of the internal market and provided
an expanded basis for consumer-related legislation.26
Additionally, it changed the voting requirement in the Council of
Ministers from unanimity to a simple majority,7 making it easier
to pass such legislation.
It was only three years later that the first consumer policy
Action Plan, which considerably raised awareness of consumer
protection, was passed.28 In 1992, the last year of the Action Plan,
the European Parliament directed the Commission of the
European Union ("Commission")29 "to review the laws of the
' Council Resolution Concerning the Future Orientation of the Policy of
the European Economic Community for the Protection and Promotion of
Consumer Interest, 1986 OJ. (C 167) 1.
23 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (Official Publication of the
Single European Act).
24 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at 54. Article 100 "authorizes
legislation in connection with the functioning of the common market."
Reindl, supra note 5, at 640.
21 Id. (discussing the impact of the 1987 Single European Act and its
differences from Article 100).
26 See id.
2 See id.
28 See Three Year Action Plan of Consumer Policy in the EEC (1990-
1992), COM(90)98 final 1 (seeking to reassure consumers that their interests
were being adequately represented in the EEC).
29 The Commission is the principal policy initiator of the EU. See
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various States on guarantee schemes," and to make proposals to
ensure a minimum European standard." The Commission was
further directed "to retain contractual guarantees that go further
than this as a special form of competition and not be regulated by
European law."3" That same year, the Council requested the
Commission's opinion" on the desirability of approximating
consumer guarantees.
33
These initiatives were contemporaneous with the most
significant breakthrough in moving consumer protection
forward- the 1992 Treaty on European Union ("The Maastricht
Treaty"). 3" The Maastricht Treaty elevated consumer protection
to the status of Union policy, requiring the Union to contribute
to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection through
"specific action which supports and supplements the policy
pursued by the Member States to protect the health, safety and
economic interests of consumers and to provide adequate
information to consumers." 3" This language allows the EEC to
adopt consumer protection measures, without requiring a direct
connection with market integration.36 Some question remains as
to whether Maastricht will enlarge the EEC's ability and/or
willingness to adopt consumer protection legislation.37 Some
commentators argue that the decisive factor will be the political
commitment of the Member States to adopt consumer protection
schemes."
NUGENT, supra note 6, at 43.
30 European Parliament Resolution on Consumer Protection and Public
Health Requirements to be taken into Account in the Completion of the
Internal Market, 1992 Oj. (C 94) 217, 221.
31 Id.
32 See NUGENT, supra note 6, at 145 (citing Treaty of Rome, art. 189,supra
note 3).
" See Council Resolution on Future Priorities for the Development of
Consumer Protection Policy, 1992 OJ. (C 186) 1, 3 (inviting the Commission
to evaluate a list of priorities, set forth in the Resolution, designed to create
consumer confidence in a single market).
14 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Oj. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
3 Id. at art. 129a(1)(b), C224/48.
36 See Reindl, supra note 5, at 641 (discussing the factors which influenced
the Community's consumer protection agenda).
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Despite these concerns, the second three-year Action Plan,
passed the year after Maastricht, concentrated on issues directly
related to enabling consumers to participate fully in the internal
market. This led to the Commission's 1993 publication of the
Green Paper concerning guarantees and after-sales services.39
Three years later, the Commission proposed the Directive on the
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees.'
2.3. The Green Paper
The decidedly consumer focus found in the 1993 Green Paper
originates both from the mandate the Commission had from the
second three-year Action Plan41 and the urgings the Commission
received from the other EU institutions to take measures with
respect to guarantees and after-sales services.42 The Green Paper
reviews the disparate law on guarantees in the then twelve
Member States and offers suggestions designed to overcome the
imbalances among them.43 Legal guarantees in the EU vary
greatly from one Member State to another. For example, the
duration of a legal guarantee ranges from an indeterminate period
in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Finland,
to six years in the UK and Ireland, two years in Sweden, one year
in Denmark, and Italy, and only six months in Germany, Spain,
Portugal, Greece, and Austria.'
"' See Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales
Services, COM(93)509 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
" Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Guarantees, 1996 Oj. (C 307) 8, 9
[hereinafter 1996 Directive] (declaring its purpose as approximating the laws of
the member states in order to ensure a uniform minimum level of consumer
protection in the internal market).
41 See Second Commission Three-Year Action Plan Placing the Single
Market at the Service of European Consumers, COM(93)378 final, (11) at 7
(stating that the community must consolidate existing law and adopt new
uniform measures in order to place the single market at the service of
consumers).
42 See Green Paper, supra note 39, at 5 (referring to formal requests by the
Council, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee
inviting the Commission to take action).
" See id. at chs. IV, VI (describing existing members' states' laws in this
area and setting forth possible actions at the Community level).
" See Consumer Policy: Showdown in Parliament Over Sales and Contracts
and Guarantees, EUR. REP., Mar. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
EISENG File (reporting the European Parliament's vote on the Directive).
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The Green Paper envisions claims against the manufacturer
for breach of legal guarantees.4" This is in contrast to the April
1998 Directive, which held the seller liable to the consumer for
breach of the contract of sale,46 except in those cases where the
manufacturer had created a commercial guarantee through public
statements and the seller was not aware and could not reasonably
have been aware of them.47 Sellers could limit their potential
liability, however, by pursuing whomever they obtained the
product from in the distribution chain.4' However, this is not the
same as giving the buyer direct access to the source of the defect.
Although the Green Paper discusses guarantees and after-sales
services, nothing in the April 1998 Directive addresses the latter.
While the Green Paper saw the two as "closely-linked,"49 the
April 1998 Directive has left treatment of after-sales services for
another day."
There are several points of departure between the Green
Paper and the April 1998 Directive. The Green Paper was
designed to open a discussion about guarantees and after-sales
services, not to create a draft Directive." It has been successful in
meeting that purpose. The Green Paper compiled, probably for
the first time, the variations among the Member States' laws. It
demonstrated how the reluctance of consumers to buy goods
" See Green Paper, supra note 39, at 87 (maintaining that suits for breach
of legal guarantees are most logically brought against the manufacturer rather
than the vendor).
46 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
17 See id. at art. 2(4).
41 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 3a.
49 Green Paper, supra note 39, at 7.
" See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Sale of Consumer
Goods and Guarantees,' 1997 O.J. (C 66) 5 [hereinafter Committee Opinion],
(noting the Committee's lament about the lack of comprehensiveness of the
1996 Directive, including the omission of after-sales services). The
Commission discussed this during the preparatory stage but omitted it from
the April 1998 Directive. See id.; see also Reind, supra note 5, at 642 n.69
(suggesting that after-sales services were abandoned in light of the subsidiarity
principle); Reindl, supra note 5, at 662 (suggesting insufficient acceptance by
usiness that reform in after-sales services was justified). The Economic and
Social Committee is composed of members appointed by Member States to
represent three groups: employers, employees, and various other coalitions
such as farmers and consumers. SeeNUGENT, supra note 6, at 180.
51 See Committee Opinion, supra note 50 at C 66/6 discussing the
relationship between the Green Paper and Committee Directives).
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away from home given their uncertainty about what protections
came with the goods impaired the concept of a single market."2
More importantly, it took the first steps toward a structure for a
unified system of guarantees.
In hindsight, the Green Paper can be seen as a consumers'
wish list of guarantee protection. Not surprisingly, political
realities intruded, and the final version of the Directive does not
deliver all the provisions advocated in the document. However,
the initial version of the Directive served as a good starting point,
and successive revisions have brought it closer to the objectives
enunciated in the Green Paper. Additionally, consumer groups
throughout the Union have utilized the Green Paper as a guide to
mark their opposition to portions of the Directive and their
advocacy for further regulation in the area of guarantees. 3
Consequently, the Green Paper has framed the debate over the
reach of the Directive and will continue to provide a roadmap for
those seeking guarantee protection within the EU.
3. THE DIRECTIVE
The Directive, first proposed on October 16, 1996, received
extensive commentary by Member States and consumer groups,
as well as in scholarly literature. 4 An amended Directive, which
5" A 1990 study carried out by the Commission on trans-frontier
consumer complaints showed that between 50% and 75% of those complaints
concerned defective products and between 10% and 75%, depending on the
Member State, concerned difficulties in invoking a commercial guarantee or
securing after-sales services. See Green Paper, supra note 39, at 8, 9. In a 1991
Eurobarometer survey, 53% of the respondents indicated that they feared the
difficulties encountered in exchanging or repairing goods purchased in another
country. See id.
" See Committee Opinion, supra note 50, at C 665; Robert Bradgate,
Consumer Guarantees: The ECs Draft Directive, 1 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES 1 (1997) (last visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1997/
issuel/bradgatel.htnil> (arguing that the main features of the Directive are
similar to English law).
" See id. (arguing that the main features of the Directive are similar to
English law); Elspeth Deards, The Proposed Guarantees Directive: Is It Fit for the
Purpose?, 21 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 99, 101-10 (1998) (assessing the potential
significance of the Directive for consumers in the UK); European Consumer
Law Group, European Consumer Law Group Opinion on the Proposal for a
Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, 21 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 91 (1998) (critically analyzing each aspect of the Directive
and offering suggestions); Reindl, supra note 5, at 639, 661-71; George T. Brady,
Comment, Consumer Protection in the European Community: Hope for the
Consumer or Unfulfilled Promises?, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 155, 196-
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took into account many of the suggestions for revisions, was
proposed by the Commission on March 31, 1998.5' This proposal
went to the European Parliament and its response was forwarded
to the Council of Ministers. On April 23, 1998, the Council of
Ministers passed yet another version, 6 which will become the
"common position." This version will be returned to the
European Parliament for approval before it can be adopted by the
Council as a Directive. 7
The European Parliament will probably act before the end of
the year, with a view to final passage in 1999.8 Nigel Griffiths,
the former Consumer Affairs Minister from the United Kingdom
("UK") and chair of the Council, expressed his commitment to
passing the Directive before the end of the year: "Our objective is
to improve consumers' rights at home and abroad and to ensure
that all consumers have the same minimum rights wherever they
buy goods in the European Union. This Directive brings real
benefits under the UK's Presidency objective of creating a
'People's Europe.""'5 Although the Directive will likely not be
passed as soon as Mr. Griffiths anticipated, the timing is critical;
the legislation could be shelved either by Austria, which currently
holds the presidency of the Council, or Germany, the next
country in line for the six-month presidency. Once the Directive
has been published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities, Member States will have three years to adopt its
provisions."
3.1. Preamble
The Preamble makes clear the extent to which awareness of
consumer interests exists. Consumers who want to purchase
?8 (1997) (noting the great amount of work the Directive will need for
implementation).
" Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on
the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, 1998 OJ. (C 148) 11
[hereinafter March 1998 Directive].
See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1.
s See Minister Secures Agreement for Europe-wide Consumer Guarantees




6 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 8.
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goods in Member States other than their State of residence are
specifically identified as playing "a fundamental role in the
completion of the internal market." 6 In order for consumers to
play their role, their economic interests must be protected.
Attaining a high level of consumer protection requires
overcoming the difficulties faced by consumers shopping across
borders, the most significant difficulty being contract disputes
over non-conforming goods.'
3.2. Article One
In Article One, the Directive articulates its scope and defines
basic terms. The stated purpose of the Directive is "the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States on certain aspects of the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees in order to ensure a
uniform minimum level of consumer protection in the context of
the internal market."63 The Directive defines a consumer as "any
natural person who, in the contracts covered by this Directive, is
acting for purposes which are not related to his trade, business or
profession."" 4 The term "consumer goods" is broadly defined to
include "any tangible moveable item.""5 There are, however,
three exceptions: (1) goods sold "by way of execution or
otherwise by authority of law;" (2) water and gas, unless they are
sold in "limited volume or set quantity;" and (3) electricity.6 The
Directive permits the Member States to provide by derogation
that "used goods sold at public auction where consumers have the
opportunity of attending the sale in person" are not consumer
goods.' Even if a Member State chooses to exclude such goods,
items purchased at an auction where the consumer does not have
the opportunity to attend, an internet auction for example,
nevertheless would be covered by the Directive.
61 Id. at pmbl.
62 See id.
63 Id. at art. 1(1).
6' Id. at art. 1(2)(a). The previous version provided that the purposes for
which the consumer was acting not be "directly" related to the consumer's
trade, business, or profession. March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art.
1(2)(a).
"' April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1(2)(b).
66 Id.
67 Id. at art. 1(3).
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A seller is defined by the Directive as "any natural or legal
person who, under a contract, sells consumer goods in the course
of his trade, business or profession."68 Producers are covered by
some of the provisions of the Directive and are defined as "the
manufacturer of goods, the importer of the goods into the
territory of the European Community or any person purporting
to be a producer by placing his name, trade mark or other
distinctive sign on the goods."69
The most significant definition in the Directive is that of
guarantee. A guarantee is "any undertaking by a seller or
producer to the consumer, given without extra charge, to
reimburse the price paid or to exchange, repair or handle goods in
any way if they do not meet the specifications set out in the
guarantee statement or in the relevant advertising."7' The March
Directive had added the word "commercial" to modify
"guarantee," adopting the language used by commentators, as
well as the Commission, to make the distinction between
commercial and legal guarantees."1  Although the word
"commercial" no longer appears, the guarantee created is
essentially the commercial guarantee contemplated by the earlier
version.
3.3. Article Two
Article Two creates legal guarantees by mandating that the
seller must deliver goods to the consumer that conform to the
contract of sale and describes four situations in which consumer
goods are presumed to conform.72 The first situation is when the
goods comply with the seller's description and possess the
qualities of any goods the seller has "held out to the consumer as
a sample or model."73 The second definition of conformity is a
guarantee that goods are fit for any particular purpose. Goods
must be fit for any particular purpose "for which the consumer
requires them and which he made known to the seller at the time
68 Id. at art. 1(2)(c).
69 Id. at art. 1(2)(d).
70 Id. at art. 1(2)(e).
7 March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 1(2)(d). See e.g., Brady, supra
note 54, at 166-67 (referring to the guarantee as a commercial guarantee).
72 April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 2(1).
71 Id. at art. 2(2)(a).
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of conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances
show that the buyer did not rely on the seller's explanations."74
The third situation is when they are "fit for the purposes for
which goods of the same type are normally used.""' The fourth
type of conformity is if the goods:
show the quality and performance which are normal in
goods of the same type and which the consumer can
reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and
taking into account any public statements on the specific
characteristics of the goods made about them by the seller,
the producer or his representative, particularly in
advertising or on labelling.76
This consumer expectation test was advocated in the
Commission's Green Paper"' and received broad support from
consumer representatives." Opposition from industry was
apparently strong enough that the first version of the Directive
did not include it,7 9 but it has since appeared in subsequent
versions."
There is no lack of conformity if the statement reads as
follows: "at the time the contract was made, the consumer was
aware or could not reasonably be unaware" that the goods did
not conform to the contract."1 In other words, the buyer who
buys a good after having inspected it under circumstances in
' Id. at art. 2(2)(b). The March version of the Directive did not contain
the final clause, although it was present in the 1996 version. See 1996 Directive,
supra note 40, at art. 2(2)(c). Its reappearance invites wrangling over what
inferences may properly be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the sale
about the degree to which the buyer relied on the seller's commentary about
the goods.
April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 2(2)(c).
z6Id. at art. 2 (2) (d).
" See Green Paper, supra note 39, at 85-86. The Green Paper uses the
phrase "consumer's legitimate expectations." Id.
78 See European Consumer Law Group, The EU Green Paper on
Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sale Services- A Response, 17J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 363, 364 (1994).
7 See Reindl, supra note 5, at 664 n.178.
80 See March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 2(2)(c); April 1998
Directive, supra note 1, at art. 2(2)(d).
81 Id. at art. 2(3).
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which she knew or should have known of the non-conformity
should not be able to complain. Further, the immediate seller is
not bound by public statements if he can show that any one of
three circumstances exists: first, that he was not and could not
reasonably be aware of the statement; second, that the statement
was corrected at the time of sale; or, third, that the statement
could not have influenced the consumer's decision to buy the
goods.8 2
In addition, any lack of conformity resulting from incorrect
installation, if installation is part of the contract and is done by
the seller or under his responsibility, is the equivalent of lack of
conformity of the goods with the contract. 3 The March 1998
version of the Directive included incorrect installation by the
consumer if such incorrect installation resulted from a lack of
conformity in the written installation instructions provided to
the consumer.8 4 This provision, however, is not in the latest
version of the Directive.
3.4. Article Three
Article Three creates the rights of the consumer. The remedy
scheme of the new version of the Directive departs significantly
from earlier versions." The seller is liable to the consumer for a
82 See id. at art. 2(4).
83 See id. at art. 2(5).
84 See March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 2(4).
85 Under the March 1998 Directive, when the seller was notified of a lack
of conformity, a hierarchy of remedies became available. The seller was
required to offer to repair the goods free of charge within a reasonable period,
or to replace the goods. See March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 3(1).
The consumer was given the right to elect either of these remedies except
under circumstances in which "only one specific claim appears economically
appropriate having regard to the seller's interests, and reasonable to the
consumer." Id. at art. 3(4). However, the consumer could demand
replacement if repairing the goods would have reduced their value. See id. If
neither of these remedies was possible, or if attempted repair did not correct
the lack of conformity, the purchaser had the right to demand reduction of the
purchase price or rescission. See id. This language was significantly different
rom the provisions of the 1996 Directive, which entitled the consumer to ask
the seller to "repair the goods free of charge within a reasonable period, or to
replace the goods, when this is possible, or to demand an appropriate price
reduction or rescission of the contract." 1996 Directive, supra note 40, at art.
3(4). To avail herself or himself of any of these remedies, the consumer was
required to notify the seller of any lack of conformity within one month from
"the date on which he detected the lack of conformity or ought normally to
[Vol 20:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss1/3
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE EU
lack of conformity existing at the time of delivery of the goods. 6
When a lack of conformity exists, the consumer is entitled to one
of four remedies: repair, replacement, price reduction, or
rescission of the contract." The consumer may require repair or
replacement, free of charge, unless the remedy that the consumer
chooses "is impossible or disproportionate." The chosen
remedy is considered disproportionate if the costs imposed on the
seller "are unreasonable taking into account the value the goods
would have if there were no lack of conformity, the significance
of the lack of conformity and whether the alternative remedy
could be completed without significant inconvenience to the
consumer."89  The Directive requires that repair or replacement
be completed within a reasonable time "without any significant
inconvenience to the consumer taking account of the nature of
the goods and the purpose for which the consumer required the
goods."
90
The remedies of price reduction or rescission come into play
if the consumer is not entitled to repair or replacement, or if the
seller has not met the obligation to complete the repair or replace
the good within a reasonable time and without significant
inconvenience to the consumer.91 The consumer is not, however,
entitled to rescission if the lack of conformity is minor.92
The article sets up the consumer's right to a remedy when the
goods that he or she purchases do not conform to the contract.93
The consumer may initially choose either repair or replacement,
have detected it." Id. at art. 4(1). The right of replacement or rescission had to
be exercised within one year. See id. at art. 3(4). In addition, the 1996
Directive provided that Member States could limit these rights for a minor lack
of conformity. See id. A significant provision that appeared in the March 1998
Directive has been omitted. It provided that tie seller bears the costs
associated with repair or replacement, citing specifically "transport, travelling,
labour or materials." March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 3(6). This
provision protected consumers from incurring te sometimes onerous expenses
of returning a good, such as an automobile, to the place of purchase for repair.
86 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
87 See id. at art. 3(2).
88 Id. at art. 3(3).
89 Id.
93 Id.
91 See id. at art. 3(4).
92 See id. at art. 3(5).
" See id. at art. 3(1).
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but if the remedy the consumer chooses is unreasonably
burdensome, the seller may instead supply an alternative.94 If
repair or replacement is unavailable or if the seller fails to act
within a reasonable time, the consumer is entitled to a reduction
in price or rescission of the contract."
3.5. Article Three-a
When the final seller is liable to the consumer for a lack of
conformity "resulting from an act of commission or omission"
by the producer, a previous seller in the chain of distribution, or
any other intermediary, he or she is entitled to indemnification.96
Those from whom the seller may require indemnification, as well
as the available causes of action and procedural rules, are governed
by national law rather than the Directive.7
3.6. Article Four
Article Four sets out the applicable time limits. The seller is
liable where the lack of conformity is discovered within two
years of the delivery of the goods.98 Significantly, the time limits
commence upon delivery, not when the defect is or should be
discovered. A consumer who buys a good for future use must be
careful, therefore, that the time limit does not expire before he or
she has used the good for the first time. The preamble notes that
Member States may suspend the two-year period for discovery of
a defect "in the event of repair, replacement, or negotiations
between seller and consumer with a view to an amicable
settlement."99 This tolling of the time period was mandatory
under the March version of the Directive' If a Member State's
national legislation imposes a time limit on consumers' remedies,
" See id. at art. 3(3).
9' See id. at art. 3(4).
96 Id. at art. 3a.
97 See id.
9' See id. at art. 4(1). The March 1998 Directive provided that the two-year
period for manifestation of a defect be suspended from the time the consumer
notified the seller of the defect until the seller's obligations were fulfilled. See
March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 5. This suspension also applied
until the conclusion of any legal or alternative dispute resolution action taken
by the consumer. See id.
99 April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at Recitals Re Article 4(1).
10" See March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 5.
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it may not be less than the two-year period mandated in the
Directive.'O Member States may provide, however, that a
consumer must notify a seller of a lack of conformity within two
months of the date on which he or she detected it."02 A lack of
conformity that manifests itself within six months of delivery is
presumed to have existed at the time of delivery, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, unless the presumption is inconsistent with
the nature of the goods or the lack of conformity."3 Perishable
products certainly fall within this exception.
3.7. Article Five
This article covers the commercial guarantee and provides
that any guarantee "must legally bind the offerer under the
conditions laid down in the guarantee statement and the
associated advertising. " 1"4 Under this article, persons other than
the seller can make a guarantee and thus be liable under its terms
for breach. The guarantee must do two things. First, it must
"state that the consumer has legal rights under applicable national
legislation governing the sale of consumer goods and make clear
that the consumer's rights under these are not affected by the
guarantee.""0 ' Second, it must "set out in plain intelligible
language the contents of the guarantee and the essential
particulars necessary for making claims under the guarantee,
notably the duration and territorial scope of the guarantee as well
as the name and address of the guarantor."" 6 The guarantee
document must be made available to the consumer upon her or
his request in writing or "feature in another durable medium
available and accessible to [her or] him.""0 '
101 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 4(1).
102 See id. at art. 4(la).
103 See id. at art. 4(2).
104 Id. at art. 5(1). Omitted from this version is the following language,
which appeared in the March version: "and must place the beneficiary in a
more advantageous position than that resulting from the rules governing the
sale of consumer goods set out in the national provisions applicable." March
1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 6.
"' April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 5(2).
lC6 Id.
10? Id. at art. 5(3).
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3.8. Article Six
Under this article, any contractual terms or agreements that
waive or restrict the consumer's rights under the Directive, made
with the seller before the consumer has notified her or him of any
lack of conformity, are not binding on the consumer.
However, Member States may allow sellers and consumers, in the
case of secondhand goods, to agree to a shorter period of liability
although not less than one year."' This article also requires
Member States to ensure that consumers are not deprived of the
Directive's protections if the law of a third country is applicable
to the contract when the "contract has a close connection with
the territory of the Member States.""'
3.9. Article Seven
This article clarifies the relationship between the provisions of
the Directive and the Member States' national laws. First, Article
Seven makes clear that any rights created by the Directive may be
exercised without prejudice to other rights that consumers have
"under the national rules governing contractual or non-
contractual liability."' This is a nod to those Member States, for
example Belgium and the UK,' that already offer more by way
of consumer protection than is required by the Directive.
Second, it permits Member States to retain or adopt more
stringent provisions than appear in the Directive, as long as they
are compatible with existing treaties, in order to ensure a high
level of consumer protection.'
The Directive creates both legal and commercial guarantees
for consumers, and an array of remedies for their breach. These
rights provide a minimum level of protection for consumers as
they engage in cross-border shopping and smooth out some of the
variations in the Member States' national laws. Although the
Directive does not go as far as many of the Member States in the
108 See id. at art. 6(1).
109 See id.
"0 Id. at art. 6(2).
... Id. at art. 7(1).
112 See Green Paper, supra note 39, at annex I (surveying the existing
domestic legal situation across European nations with respect to consumer
guarantees and after-sales services conditions).
11 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 7(2).
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actual protections provided,' it clearly sets the tone and
expectation for a high level of consumer protection throughout
the EU.
4. COMPARISON TO U.C.C. WARRANTIES AND OTHER
PROVISIONS
The Directive's legal guarantees have a familiar ring to those
versed in the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). The
Directive's legal guarantees are, in U.C.C. terminology, the
implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose."' Given the thirty-plus year
history of the U.C.C. in the United States," 6 a review of the
warranty sections and what they have come to mean might prove
instructive to gauge the future of the Directive's guarantee
provisions.
Unlike the Directive, the U.C.C. is not a consumer protection
statute. It applies to all sales of goods, no matter what type of
goods and no matter who the buyer and seller are. 7 As such, it is
not aimed at consumer protection, but rather at unifying the law
covering sales. The warranty provisions are a small piece of the
entire statute. Compare the scope of the Directive, which is
aimed at consumer goods sold to a consumer and which specifies
that the seller be a merchant seller."' Given the differing policies
of the two documents- unification of sales law on the one hand
and unification plus consumer protection on the other- there are
bound to be differences in scope and approach. That said, there
are sufficient similarities to make comparison instructive.
First, as with the Directive, the U.C.C. did not break new
114 See Green Paper, supra note 39, at annex I.
11 See generally U.C.C. § 2-314(2); S 2-315 (1998) (stating the requirements
of the implied warranty of merchantability and of fitness, respectively).
116 See generally U.C.C., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been
Adopted (1998) (citing the effective dates for the U.C.C. in various American
states as generally in the 1960s).
See generally U.C.C. S 2-301 (1998) (describing the general obligations of
parties to a sales contract, referring to the parties as simply "seller" and
"buyer" with no further refinements).
... See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (defining "consumer"
as "any natural person who . .. is acting for purposes which are not [directly]
relatedto his trade, business or profession" and defining merchant "seller" as
"any natural or legal person who, under a contract, sells consumer goods in the
course of his trade").
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ground in all the jurisdictions it affected. Its predecessor, the
Uniform Sales Act, imposed implied warranties in those states
that adopted it."9 For other states, the U.C.C. was the first
venture into the uncharted waters of caveat venditor.120 Such will
be the case with the Directive. For some Member States, the
Directive restates or merely modifies existing law.12 1  Other
Member States will experience a complete turnaround in existing
law when they pass their harmonizing legislation." But unlike
individual states adopting the U.C.C., Member States do not have
a piece of model legislation with which to work. The Directive
provides results to be achieved and leaves the Member States to
determine how best to implement those goals. A fair amount of
uniformity may be lost in the implementation from state to state.
However, because most Member States are civil law countries
without a strong common law tradition," 3 the quest for
uniformity will come primarily through the passage of
harmonizing legislation.
The Directive's legal guarantee language and the U.C.C.'s
warranty of merchantability language are not precisely the same,
but there are certain parallels. The Directive provides that goods
must be "fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type
are normally used." 24 Compare U.C.C. Section 2-314's language
of "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used." 25  The point of both sections is to protect the buyer's
expectation that the goods are of sound quality and durability,
and sold at a fair price. The goods are not necessarily perfect and
may wear out over time, but not necessarily faster than similar
goods. If those expectations are not realized, the legal guarantee
119 See UNIF. SALES ACT % 13-16 (1906). The Uniform Sales Act did not
achieve the universality among the states eventually enjoyed by the U.C.C.
Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia adopted the Act. See David
Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 275 (1998).
120 See Owen, supra note 119, at 275 n.11 (defining caveat venditor as an
implied warranty of freedom from defects against the seller, if the product was
purchased at a "sound price," citing Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 229 S.E.2d
728, 730 (1976)).
121 See Green Paper, supra note 39, at Annex I.
122 See id.
123 The common law Member States (Ireland and the United Kingdom)
already imply warranties in sales contracts. See id. at 21-22.
124 April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 2(2)(c).
125 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1998).
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has been breached and the buyer has recourse against the seller.
Both contemplate a quality level that is neither too optimistic nor
too pessimistic in scope. To help standardize that quality level,
both the U.C.C."6 and the Directive12 employ the consumer
expectation test.
The Directive's fitness guarantee states that the goods must be
"fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires
them and which he had made known to the seller at the time of
conclusion of the contract ... "12 Somewhat more complicated
is the U.C.C.'s warranty of fitness for a particular purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified.., an implied warranty that
the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 29
Several conditions must occur, however, before this warranty
comes into existence: 1) the seller learns of the buyer's purpose,
either directly or through facts and circumstances; 2) the seller
realizes that the buyer is relying on him or her to select the
appropriate goods; and 3) the buyer does, in fact, rely on the
seller to select the appropriate goods.13 The foregoing is a
somewhat more involved process than the Directive's, which does
not require that the seller realize that the buyer is relying on his
or her expertise. 3' The Directive's language, however, does
require that information about the buyer's particular purpose be
transmitted explicitly to the seller 32 rather than permitting the
guarantee to arise when the seller should have inferred the buyer's
special purpose. Additionally, unlike the warranty of
126 See U.C.C. S 2-404 (American Law Institute, Discussion Draft, April
14, 1997, note 4 (making key changes to Article 2 of the U.C.C.)) [hereinafter
REVISED U.G.C.].
127 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 2(2)(d).
128 Id. at art. 2(2)(b).
129 U.C.C. S 2-315 (1998).
130 See id.
131 See generally April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 2, 3.
132 See id. at art. 2(2)(b).
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int l Econ. L.
merchantability, the U.C.C.'s warranty of fitness does not
explicitly require a merchant seller.'33 However, because of the
warranty's other requirements, it would be unlikely to arise in
circumstances that do not include a merchant seller.' The
U.C.C. is in contrast to the Directive, which imposes its
guarantees on professional sellers only.3
Both the Directive and the U.C.C. provide for express
warranties (the commercial guarantees of the Directive). In
both documents, the express warranties are activated when sellers
(sellers or producers in the Directive)13 make explicit affirmations
about the goods beyond the implied affirmations. Buyers have an
action for breach when those explicit promises are not kept.13
Unlike the Directive, the U.C.C. permits the exclusion or
modification of warranties.39 Considering the scope of the
statute, it is not surprising that it permits sellers to structure their
deals. The Directive, as a consumer statute, assumes that
consumer buyers are in no position to bargain for exclusions or
limitations of warranties and thus prohibits sellers from excluding
or limiting them. 4
Although the two pieces of legislation are more similar than
different, there are two significant points of departure where the
U.C.C.'s warranty protection outstrips the Directive's and both
merit discussion. One is the extension of warranty protection
beyond the immediate buyer and seller. The other is the recital
of remedies that are available to the buyer for breach of warranty.
It is tempting to speculate that similar extended protections will
133 See U.C.C. 5 2-315 (1998).
134 See id.
135 See A pi 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1(2)(c) (describing the
merchant seller covered by the Directive as "any natural or egal person who,
under a contract, sells consumer goods in the course of his trade, business or
profession").
136 See, e.., April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 2(2)(a); U.C.C.
2-313 (1998) (defining express warranties by the seller as those created by
affirmation, promise, description, or sample).
"3 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 1(2)(c) - (d).
138 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 3 (describing the various
rights of the consumer in the event of lack of conformity with the contract).
139 See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1998). For example, the seller might utilize
expressions such as "as is," or "with all faults," to negate an inference of even
an implied warranty.
140 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 6(1).
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be read into the Directive; that is, however, not a foregone
conclusion.
As a result of Section 2-318 revisions precipitated by case law
developments in the area of product liability,"4 U.C.C. warranty
protection extends beyond the purchaser and seller of a good.
Stated as a menu of options from which individual states select,
Section 2-318, at a minimum, permits members of a buyer's
family or guests in the household to claim under the warranty.'
Each option extends the warranty's reach a little further.
Alternative B extends warranty protection to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the good and who suffers personal injury occasioned by the
breach."43 Alternative C, the broadest of the three options,
extends warranty protection to any person (not necessarily a
human being) who is injured and who could reasonably be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods.'"
A similar extension is probably not in the offing under the
Directive. Despite significant criticism from commentators,
consumer groups, and others,'45 the Directive very clearly limits
those who can claim breach under the legal guarantee to those
who are in privity with the seller.'46 Neither the manufacturer of
the good nor intermediate distributors are bound by the legal
guarantees, although any entity in the chain of distribution is
bound by commercial guarantees it may make.'47 Moreover,
users beyond the ultimate buyer are out of luck if they suffer the
consequences of a breach of guarantee.' Whatever may be the
' This trend began with the 1960 decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 N.J. 1960) and was furthered by Dean Prosser's
seminal article. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
142 See U.C.C. S 2-318, Alternative A (1998). This alternative obviously
assumes a consumer buyer and therefore a consumer good. Note that the
warranty does not extend vertical privity beyond the immediate seller, but
extends horizontal privity to a defined group of non-privity parties.
143 See U.C.C. S 2-318, Alternative B (1998). This alternative contemplates
as the injured party a human being who has suffered physical injury.
144 See U.C.C. S 2-318, Alternative C (1998). Because the injured party
could be a fictitious person, the injury can be purely economic, unlike the
other alternatives.
145 See sources cited supra note 54.
146 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 1(2)(c), 3.
141 See id. at art. 3a (binding the contractual chain of distribution).
148 Remote buyers and users will have claims in product liability if the
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state of the law in the United States, it seems that privity is alive
and well in Europe, at least insofar as the guarantees with which
the Directive is concerned.
The U.C.C. remedies available for breach of warranty are
more generous than the Directive's. Specifically, the U.C.C.
permits the buyer to claim incidental and consequential damages
occasioned by the breach, including damages for physical
injury.49 Even though a contract generally can limit or modify
the available remedies, a limitation on consequential damages for
physical injury in the case of consumer goods is considered prima
facie unconscionable.15 This provision was absolutely key to the
eventual importation of the U.C.C.'s warranty provisions into
U.S. product liability law."'1 Many have noted the connection
between the Directive and the emerging product liability law in
the EU.ls2 However, the Directive very specifically limits the
buyer's remedies to a choice of repair, replacement, reduction in
price, or rescission of the contract. 3 Clearly the point of the
Directive is to provide a remedy for a consumer's dashed
expectations, and not to provide a remedy for any product
liability claims that may arise with respect to the good.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the EU will see an extension of
remedies analogous to the U.C.C.'s in the context of this
Directive. This is not to say that subsequent legislation may not
be proposed that would provide such an extension, but, if it
occurs, it will likely be in furtherance of product liability law in
the EU, and not of guarantee law.
The foregoing suggests that the U.C.C. provides a good model
for the workings of legal and commercial guarantees in the EU,
insofar as the provisions are compatible. However, one must be
good does physical harm, but are foreclosed from recovery for nonconformity
of the good to the contract. See Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 28,
29 [hereinafter Council Directive of 25 July 1985].
149 See U.C.C. 5 2-715 (1998).
soee id. at S 2-719.
151 See Owen, supra note 119, at 275 (describing the development of
product liability law).
152 For an example of emerging product liability law, see Council Directive
of 25 July 1985, supra note 148, at 29, for an example of emerging product
liability law where producers can be found liable for defective products.
153 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 3(3)-(4).
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cautious in assuming that all the developments leading to the
current U.C.C. will be mirrored in the EU. Perhaps mindful of
what the U.C.C. has come to signify, the Directive on guarantees
is specifically and explicitly limited to prevent a similar evolution.
This discussion would not be complete without reference to
the attempts to revise U.C.C. Article 2."' The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is
undertaking a project to redraft the Article."'5 The project is
ongoing and no final set of revisions has emerged from the
drafting committee."' However, certain trends can be detected,
some of which have a direct bearing on the U.C.C. sections
related to the Directive. Consequently, comparisons between the
applicable revised sections and the Directive are useful.
Minor word changes to the implied warranty of
merchantability"5 7 do not seem to alter the comparison previously
undertaken. No changes are proposed to the implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose.158 Similarly the provisions to
exclude warranties and limit remedies and the expansion of the
warranties beyond those in privity do not change the previous
comparison.
One instance where the revisions to Article 2 bring the statute
more in line with the Directive is in the area of express
warranties. Under certain circumstances, advertising can create
express warranties,15 9 thus paralleling the Directive's notion of
public statements creating guarantees. According to the recently
revised statute, the warranties created by public statements may
extend to remote buyers,"O as may other forms of express
154 See generally REVISED U.C.C., supra note 126.
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 REVISIONS OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 - SALES
S2-404 (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1998)
[hereinafter REVISED U.C.C.]. One change is that for goods to be
merchantable, they must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of
that description are used." Id. at § 2-404(b)(3).
158 REVISED U.C.C. § 2-405.
159 Id. at 5 2-403(a) (providing that any representation made by a seller,
including advertising, which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
for the bargain creates an express warranty).
161 Id. at § 2-408(c). The circumstances for this happening are if the remote
buyer purchases from someone "in the normal chain of distribution with
knowledge of the representation" and that a reasonable person would expect
that the goods would perform as promised. Id. at § 2-408(c)(1), (2).
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warranties.161 Unlike the Directive, however, revised Article 2
also provides that express warranties may extend beyond remote
purchasers even when made through a medium other than public
communication. Specifically, warranty protection extends to any
member of the remote buyer's family or guest in the
household. 62  No such extension is contemplated by the
Directive. It should be noted that, in the case of these so-called
"pass through" warranties, the remote buyer gets no more or no
less by way of protection than the immediate buyer. In other
words, the seller is free to place limitations on the warranty that
will restrict the remote buyer and others, even though the two
parties never dealt face-to-face. 63 So, while revised Article 2 is
somewhat more permissive than the Directive with respect to the
parties who may make a claim under an express warranty
("guarantee" in Directive language), it is more restrictive in that
sellers may limit the effect of their warranties and that the
limitation will be binding on everyone down the chain. In the
event of litigation, traditional notions of unconscionability may
change that result in individual cases, but the bare-bones language
of the revision permits the limitation."'
5. IMPACT OF THE DIRECTIVE
A British negotiator trumpeted to the press that the Directive
"will be the biggest change to consumer rights for [twenty]
years. " "" This claim may be more hyperbole than an honest
assessment of its impact. As the Directive draws closer to
implementation, it is worthwhile to reflect on what it does and
does not accomplish, what its impact on consumers and sellers in
the EU will be, and whether it reflects sound consumer policy.
A threshold question is whether the Directive's mandates are
161 Id. at § 2-408(b). In this instance the representation about the good
must be "in a record packaged with or accompanying the goods and the seller"
must reasonably expect the record to be transmitted to the remote buyer. Id.
162 Id. at S 2-408(b)(2)(A).
163 Id. at S 2-408(b)(2)(B) (providing that the seller may limit its obligation
to the remote consumer, provided that any limitation is furnished to the
remote consumer with the record that makes the representation, or at the time
of sale, whichever is later).
164 Id.
165 Marie Woolf, Shoppers Win Europe-Wide Right to Refunds, THE
OBSERVER, Apr. 19, 1998, at 2 (describing how consumers might benefit from
the Directive's broadening of guarantees for certain consumer goods).
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even within the purview of the EU to undertake. The Maastricht
Treaty includes an article that requires EU institutions to practice
subsidiarity.16' Subsidiarity is a concept analogous to federalism
in U.S. law and restrains the Union from legislating in areas that
can and should be handled at the Member State level. U.S.
commentators cannot resist drawing a connection to the concept
of enumerated powers and most especially to commerce clause
jurisprudence under the U.S. Constitution. 67 Analyzing the
meaning and implementation of subsidiarity 68 is beyond the
scope of this paper, other than to note its potential application
within the context of the guarantee Directive. Some
commentators have mused over whether the Directive violates
the subsidiarity principle.169 In light of the variances among the
Member States with respect to warranty protection, the Directive
comports with the subsidiarity principle. This contention is
supported by the explicit inclusion of consumer protection, also
added by the Maastricht Treaty, into the goals of the single
market. There are many, however, who would disagree with this
analysis and would contend that in enacting the Directive, the
European Community has acted outside its jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, even beyond this preliminary issue, the Directive is
subject to attack on both its substance and impact.
Despite all of the background study and reporting that
16 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 34, at art. 3b, C 224/9 (stating that"in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the European Community [shall
take action] ... only if and in so far as the objectives of the propose action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. ... ").
167 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 423 (1994)
(concluding that jurisprudence does not necessarily guarantee the proper
balancing between the federal governments and states' rights); Reindl, supra
note 5, at 640 (describing how the European Community's power to legislate
stems from the concept of enumerated powers).
16' For a thorough and well-written treatment of subsidiarity, including its
comparisons to federalism, see Bermann, supra note 167, at 403.
169 See Deards, supra note 54, at 114-15 (discussing how consumers may
lose potential protection because Member States are unwilling to provide
higher standards of protection than their neighboring Member States and the
EEC is hesitant to pass legislation for fear of violating the principle of
subsidiarity); Reindl, supra note 5, at 63542 (suggesting the recent
strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity may further limit the EC's
willingness to legislate); Brady, supra note 54, at 164-65 (describing how the
principle of subsidiarity has made the European Community hesitant to pass
consumer rights legislation).
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occurred before the first version was proposed, the final version
of the Directive is weak as regards legal guarantees. First, it
provides fairly minimal levels of protection and severely
-circumscribes who is protected by and who is obligated to
provide those minimum guarantees. National law can enhance
the rights of buyers; indeed, some Member States' laws already
do. Our concern is that the floor created by the Directive will
become the de facto ceiling, especially in those Member States
that do not currently provide the level of protection afforded by
the Directive. The influence of local business interests can more
easily be exerted at the Member State level than at the federal
level in shaping the harmonizing legislation. However, this is an
opportunity for Member States to make a good faith effort at
consumer protection. It would be unfortunate if Member States
used stingy harmonization to derail the policy of consumer
protection or, perhaps even worse, to erect trade barriers.
Similarly, the Directive established a very weak standard in
the area of commercial guarantees. The only requirements are
that the commercial guarantees offer better protection than the
legal guarantees, that they be available for perusal before purchase
when the consumer so requests, and that they include certain
information to enable consumers to invoke them."'0 Beyond
these requirements, national law governs the guarantees, thus
permitting variation among the Member States. While this
portion of the Directive furthers the consumer protection policy,
the goal of uniformity within the single market is left behind.
EU policymakers hope that market forces will give those offering
comprehensive commercial guarantees a competitive advantage.
Nevertheless, one should be cautious about this assumption in
light of the current practice of offering extended commercial
guarantees at a price. The Directive curbs this practice and
requires that, when given, the commercial guarantees within the
Directive's parameters be offered free of charge."' 1 However, the
selling of commercial guarantees is an example of the market
promoting, rather than eliminating, opportunistic behavior by
sellers. Extended guarantees are often not worth the money paid
for them compared to the cost of repair and the incidents of
170 See March 1998 Directive (amended proposal), supra note 55, at art. 6,
C 148/19.
... See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1(2)(c).
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breakdown." The offering of additional protection accompanied
by high-pressure selling is another way sellers part consumers
from their money."3 However, if the guarantees offer more than
the legal minimum set out in the Directive, nothing prohibits the
continued practice of offering extended guarantees at a price. We
expect to see more not less of the practice. The policymakers
obviously have more faith than we do in the market's ability, or
willingness, to correct abuses.
The cost of compliance with the Directive is not irrelevant,
especially in light of the fact that most of its obligations are
imposed upon the seller, who may be a small business or
individual. Producers will also experience compliance costs, but
these costs are voluntarily taken when they make commercial
guarantees, or public statements that amount to commercial
guarantees. The Commission ordered a study on the economic
impact of the Directive to help evaluate the predictions made by
industry." The report concluded that industry had substantially
overestimated the costs of compliance.' It found that the
clothing, shoe, leather, and furniture sectors would experience
almost no additional costs, while other sectors would experience
an increase of .5% to 6.6% (the latter in the computer industry)., 6
If the study's conclusions are closer to reality than industry
estimates, it can be said that compliance with the Directive will
not be costless, however those costs will be manageable (even
negligible in some sectors) and can probably be absorbed.
While we welcome the provisions added to the latest version
of the Directive, especially insofar as they clarify the hierarchy of
remedies and the obligations of the seller when a legal guarantee is
invoked, there are still some unanswered questions. Perhaps the
172 See Rosanna Spero, End Is Near for Warranty Deals; Money Mail, DAILY
MAIL (LONDON), June 3, 1998, at 48 (providing examples in which the cost of
a warranty is greater than the cost of repairs).
' The Preamble to the latest version of the Directive acknowledges that
commercial guarantees may be "a simple publicity ploy and deceive the
consumer." April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl.
"74 See, e.g., Consumer Policy: Showdown in Parliament over Sales Contracts
and Guarantees, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE: EUROPEAN REPORT, Mar. 7,
1998, at No. 2297; Europe Information Service, European Report, Mar. 7,
1998, available in LEXIS.
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notion of trans-border shopping creates obstacles that the
Directive simply cannot remedy. Attempting to invoke the
protections of the guarantees from a distance will always pose
some difficulties for the buyer; returning to the place of sale for a
refund, or returning the good for repair or replacement, is not
costless. The Directive places the cost of repair and replacement
squarely on the seller (unless the cost is disproportionate), and
requires that the consumer not be significantly inconvenienced.'77
However, the language does not specifically mention the costs of
travel or return of the goods to the seller, although an earlier
version of the Directive did.'78 The Directive should explicitly
mandate that these costs be paid by the seller in order to avoid
possible arguments concerning the meaning of "significant
inconvenience."
The Directive fails to allocate the admittedly amorphous costs
of time and energy spent by the buyer initiating and following up
on the repair or replacement process. One cost that the
consumer may be willing to absorb is that of dropping in at a
local shop for an exchange or repair. However, a consumer may
not be willing to absorb, or even may be dissuaded from pursuing
the remedies offered by the guarantee, by the costs of returning to
a distant location, carrying on correspondence or phone calls, or
bundling a good for return. We recommend that the Directive
assess and account for additional hidden costs to the seller as well.
Sales consummated on the internet will pose similar
challenges while these sales grow every year. While internet sales
eliminate the need for consumers to travel across borders to
purchase goods, all the hidden costs mentioned above will still
apply if the goods do not satisfy the guarantees. Additionally, the
internet is a market in its infancy, and sellers are just now testing
its viability and potential. Consequently, sellers are transient, and
many leave no paper trail as to their whereabouts. An internet
buyer who resorts to guarantee protections may find that his or
her seller has vanished into cyberspace. Traditional sellers may
go out of business too, but there is usually some physical trail to
help locate them. Often, that is not true with internet sellers.
Because the Directive does not offer recourse against
manufacturers or distributors, if the seller is unavailable to satisfy
177 See April 1998 Directive, supra note 1, at art. 3(3), (4).
178 See March 1998 Directive, supra note 55, at art. 3(6).
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the conditions of the legal guarantees, the buyer is left without a
remedy. The risk is significantly greater in internet sales. Thus, a
provision giving the consumer recourse to others in the chain of
distribution, if the seller is unavailable, would seem to be
warranted, especially for internet buyers.
The goal of uniformity is only minimally realized by the
Directive. Many opportunities for local law to deviate from the
Directive exist by virtue of the Directive's references to existing
national law. Therefore, the ideal of a uniform law of guarantee
across the Union is more imagined than real. The situation has
caused one disappointed member of the European Parliament to
observe:
In practice consumers would still be unsure what their
rights are in another country. Lawyers will love it. The
directive's apparent two-year guarantee of reimbursement,
replacement or repair in the case of faulty goods, far from
being a universal boon, will land consumers in disputes
with retailers all over Europe."9
The Directive misses the mark of making the purchase of
consumer goods seamless throughout Europe, despite all its good
intentions. At best, it can be said that consumers will be more
aware of their minimum rights. At worst, the situation is still
chaotic and fraught with uncertainty for the intrepid European
shopper. The last word has not been written on the Directive. It
still must go to the Parliament and the Council before its final
adoption. We can only hope that the concerns about these
discontinuities embedded within the Directive will be addressed
then and resolved.
Although there are specific provisions to criticize, by no
means should the Directive be voted down. We cannot agree that
it represents the biggest change to consumer rights in twenty
years. It is, however, an important start on a program of
consumer protection, albeit a small one. It is appropriate that
consumer protection has finally been explicitly adopted as an EU
policy. Among other things, it has the effect of bringing the
179 Caroline Jackson MEP, Letter to the Editor, Consumer Unfriendly,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), May 10, 1998, at 36.
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consumer into the single market picture. While debates rage over
macro issues such as monetary policy, merger guidelines, barriers
to trade, and the like, the consumer must feel like he or she has
gotten lost in the shuffle of moving to a single market. The
Directive helps drive home the point that individuals are a part of
and have much to gain from the overall unification effort. What
could be more demonstrative than a law that affects such a
familiar occurrence as purchasing a consumer good? It is an
activity, unlike travel or setting up a business, that individuals
undertake nearly every day. As such, the Directive's symbolic
value may outstrip its legal significance.
While the Directive offers minimum levels of consumer
protection and does not make substantial changes to existing
Member States' laws, EU policymakers are clearly looking ahead
to the possible inclusion of states from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.18 All fifteen current Member States of the
EU already have some sort of guarantee associated with the sale of
goods. The details and the scope of coverage vary, but the
principle remains fairly constant throughout the Union. The
same may not be true for the states seeking entrance into the EU.
The Directive sets a threshold level requiring that a Member State
must offer at least a minimum level of consumer protection to
gain admission into the common market.
Finally, the Directive has a role to play in setting business
practices. To be sure, the Directive only sets the legal stage for
warranty protection. In order to give full force to the guarantees,
businesses will have to operationalize the language to give their
customers the full measure of protection. The Directive cannot
always monitor the recalcitrant seller who refuses to abide by the
Directive or sits on complaints hoping to wait out the consumer.
It will be easy to ignore, at least at first, distant consumers who
are demanding refunds, repairs, or replacements. A retailer will
always pay closer attention to the local customer who can
provide repeat business and whose complaints will be
communicated to others in the local customer base. With the
Directive as a legal mandate, business practices will eventually
"' See European Commission, Consumer Protection in the EU: Progress and
Priorities or the Future, (Background Report, Oct. 1996) (visited Jan. 18, 1999)
<http://www.cec.org.uk/pubs/br/br96/br9612.htm> (listing development
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conform to its prescriptions. There is no guaranty that buyers
will not encounter slow or reluctant sellers, but, if they have the
Directive to support their claims, they at least bargain from a
position of strength. As the details of the Directive become
integrated into day-to-day business practice, presumably
consumers will experience smoother, or at least not unduly
burdensome, procedures for seeking satisfaction. This, as much as
anything, authenticates the Directive as sound consumer policy.
6. CONCLUSION
The last word has not yet been written on the Directive.
Despite optimistic predictions that it could go into force by 1999,
there are still a number of steps to take before the Directive
becomes final. Any one of those steps could produce different
provisions than those outlined here or kill the Directive's chances
for passage altogether. Nevertheless, there is sufficient interest
and debate surrounding the Directive that we believe passage in
some form is likely. The question then becomes whether its
passage will produce the results envisioned by its proponents.
One perplexing aspect of the Directive not likely to be
changed is the many opportunities afforded Member States to
derogate from its terms. If one purpose for treating guarantees at
the Community level is to create uniformity in all the Member
States, the drafters have lost momentum on this point. Given the
ample opportunity to deviate from the Directive's terms, it is
doubtful the desired uniformity can be realized. In many
instances the purpose of permitting deviations is to allow Member
States to provide a higher level of consumer protection than what
is offered by the Directive. In other instances, it is simply to let
domestic law govern what has traditionally been considered the
province of local control, namely contracts. Whatever the
motivations, the Directive by itself will not produce the desired
result of a harmonized guarantee law throughout the EU, and
that is to be lamented.
The failure to create producer liability for breach of the legal
guarantees is likewise regrettable. Inasmuch as the EU has
recognized consumers and has purported to create a high level of
consumer protection via the Directive, the approach of limiting
liability to only sellers is particularly surprising. Making a simple
equity argument, producers are usually in a better position than
sellers to make good on faulty wares. Consumers are often
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buying a brand name, because of confidence in the brand name.
If asked, consumers would probably reply that they expect
recourse from the manufacturer of the product, as opposed to the
seller, if it turns out to be defective. The Directive requires
examination of producer liability within four years. That seems a
remarkably long time to study the matter, especially when. there
are no assurances that the investigation will result in a change to
the Directive's provisions on this point.
It should be obvious that passage of the Directive will not
herald sweeping changes in consumer protection throughout the
EU, not only because of the level of protection already existing in
a number of Member States, but also because the provisions of
the Directive do not set the bar very high. It is, however, sound
consumer policy, and creating a minimum level of protection is
useful on a number of fronts. First, it is an important early step
toward the goal of creating a high level of consumer protection in
the EU. Second, it signals consumers that the EU is responding
to the difficulties they encounter as they try to take advantage of
the single market by shopping across borders. Third, it will play
a role over time in setting more consumer-oriented business
practices. Finally, it sets the stage for a higher level of consumer
protection in countries that want to become part of the EU but
do not have a long or strong tradition of consumerism. With all
that in mind, it will be important for the EU to follow up on a
number of fronts.
The harmonization process must be monitored closely to
gauge how Member States are bringing their laws in line with the
Directive's provisions. Several concerns are implicated. First, are
Member States meeting, but not exceeding, the level of consumer
protection envisioned by the Directive? Are Member States that
currently offer more protection lowering their standards? When
the Member States pass domestic laws to harmonize with the
Directive, do those laws, taken as a whole, create widely disparate
levels of protection from state to state?
The EU should gather evidence of how consumers seek
redress under the Directive and whether or not they are successful
in doing so. Policy makers can then determine whether business
practices have conformed to the Directive's mandates. The
evidence should also reveal whether, despite its provisions, the
Directive creates unintended burdens when consumers seek to
invoke its remedies. It is not enough to gather the evidence. It
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will be important for the EU to act on it.
There is additionally the question of the future of extended
warranties. The availability of, costs associated with, and selling
techniques accompanying extended warranties should be watched
closely to determine whether consumers are being induced to
purchase duplicative and unnecessary coverage.
Finally, the consumer focus should be more apparent in the
Directive. This can be accomplished by creating producer
liability, by clarifying how consumers can invoke the hierarchy
of remedies, and by easing the burdens of returning the goods for
replacement or repair. There is also an opportunity to create
dispute resolution processes, other than litigation, that will
handle disputes between buyers and sellers over each other's
rights and duties.
We continue to cling to the Directive's symbolic value. It does
signal the EU's interest in, if not commitment to, consumers.
Presumably the foray into consumer protection, which this
Directive symbolizes, will be followed by others. Only when
there exists a compendium of efforts aimed at consumers can it be
honestly said that the promise of consumer protection, as pledged
in the Maastricht Treaty, has been realized.
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